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Abstract.
Consider two parties who can make non-contractible investments in the provision
of a public good. Who should own the physical assets needed to provide the
public good? In the literature it has been argued that the party who values the
public good most should be the owner, regardless of the investment technologies.
Yet, this result has been derived under the assumption of symmetric information.
We show that technology matters when the negotiations over the provision of the
public good take place under asymmetric information. If party A has a better
investment technology, ownership by party A can be optimal even when party B
has a larger expected valuation of the public good.
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1 Introduction
One of the most fundamental questions in public economics is who should be
the owner of public projects. For example, should the government or a non-
governmental organization (NGO) be in charge of running a school? Should gov-
ernment agencies at the federal or at the local level be the owners of facilities that
are required to provide local public goods?
The optimal allocation of ownership rights is a central theme of the incom-
plete contracting approach developed by Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and
Moore (1990).1 In this literature, parties can make non-contractible investments
and subsequently bargain over the division of the investments’ returns. Physical
assets are necessary to realize the returns. Ownership of the assets determines
the parties’ disagreement payoffs in the ex post negotiations. A central conclu-
sion of the incomplete contracting approach is that when one party has a superior
investment technology in an otherwise symmetric setting, then this party should
be the owner.
While most applications of the incomplete contracting approach deal with
the boundaries of private firms, a few studies have also investigated who should
own the physical assets needed to provide public goods. By now, the leading
application of the incomplete contracting theory to the choice between public and
private ownership is Hart et al. (1997). Their model captures situations in which
private for-profit entities may invest in tasks such as running a prison, so the
investing party does not directly care about the public good to be provided.2
In contrast, Besley and Ghatak (2001) study a model in which two parties can
1See also Hart (1995) for a textbook exposition. The incomplete contracting approach is
widely regarded as one of the most important advances in microeconomic theory in the past
three decades (cf. Aghion et al., 2016).
2Hence, Hart et al. (1997) is close to a private-good setup. For more recent work in this vein,
see e.g. King and Pitchford (2008), Hoppe and Schmitz (2010), De Brux and Desrieux (2014),
and Hamada (2017). See also Walker (2016) for a literature survey.
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make non-contractible investments and subsequently bargain over the provision
of a public good that both parties may care about. Their lead example is the
relationship between a government and an educational NGO, that may both care
about the quality of a school. The main conclusion of their analysis is that the
party who values the public good most should be the owner, regardless of the
investment technology. This result is in contrast to the fundamental insight of the
incomplete contracting approach according to which the investment technology is
an important determinant of the optimal ownership structure.
In the present contribution, we show that Besley and Ghatak’s (2001) cen-
tral result crucially relies on their assumption that the parties are symmetrically
informed. Specifically, we consider a version of their setup in which the parties
privately learn the valuations after the investments have been made, so that ne-
gotiations about the provision of the public good take place under asymmetric
information. It turns out that in this case the investment technology plays an im-
portant role in determining the optimal ownership structure, which is in contrast
to the main conclusion of Besley and Ghatak (2001), but in line with the insights
of the original property rights theory developed by Oliver Hart and his coauthors.
In particular, we show that if party A has a better investment technology than
party B, then ownership by party A can be optimal even when party A has a
smaller expected valuation of the public good than party B.
Our findings are important, because in practice there are many situations in
which two parties invest in a public good that they both care about. For instance,
NGOs are often involved in various public projects in less developed countries (e.g.,
building agricultural extension systems to serve farmers, or developing monitoring
and screening technologies for microlending programs).3 Moreover, as has been
emphasized by Besley and Ghatak (2001, p. 1366), the “notion of joint provision
3See e.g. Aldashev and Navarra (2018) and Roy and Chowdhury (2009). Note also that
NGOs have played a controversial role in the context of illegal immigration, e.g. in the recent
European migrant crisis.
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of public goods by concerned parties is of much wider interest than government-
NGO relations”. For example, the two parties in the model could be different units
of the government (local versus federal), or partners collaborating on projects in
the fields of scientific research or art. In each of these instances, it seems to be
realistic that the parties are not perfectly informed about each other’s valuation
of the public good.4
Related literature. With regard to optimal ownership structures in private-
good settings, following the seminal work of Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart
and Moore (1990), most papers in the incomplete contracting literature are fo-
cused on symmetric information. Hence, in line with the Coase Theorem nego-
tiations always lead to an ex post efficient agreement after the non-contractible
investments are sunk.5 Yet, the fact that in practice we often observe ex post
inefficiencies has been emphasized by several authors such as Holmström and
Roberts (1998) and Williamson (2000, 2002). In Schmitz (2006), an otherwise
standard version of the Grossman-Hart-Moore property rights model has been
studied where the ex post negotiations take place under asymmetric information,
such that ex post inefficiencies may occur.6 More recently, further studies such
as Goltsman (2011), Goldlücke and Schmitz (2014), and Su (2017a) have also
explored different aspects of hold-up problems under asymmetric information in
private-good contexts.
With regard to optimal ownership structures in public-good settings, to the
4Indeed, the presence of asymmetric information is actually a standard assumption in the
complete contracting (i.e., mechanism design) literature on public good provision; see e.g. Ar-
row (1979), d’Aspremont and Gérard-Varet (1979), Crémer and Riordan (1985), Mailath and
Postlewaite (1990), Norman (2004), Ledyard and Palfrey (2007), and Goldlücke and Schmitz
(2018).
5See the recent review article by Medema (2020) for an extensive discussion of the literature
on the Coase Theorem (cf. Coase, 1960).
6See also Mori (2017, 2020) for alternative explanations of ex post inefficiencies in the theory
of the firm due to haggling and ex post adaptations.
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best of my knowledge all papers building on Besley and Ghatak (2001) so far
have assumed that there is symmetric information. Specifically, Francesconi and
Muthoo (2011) consider a model in which the default payoffs are linear combina-
tions of the public-good and the private-good cases. Halonen-Akatwijuka (2012)
studies a variant of Besley and Ghatak (2001) in which a party’s investment
may have a stronger impact on the disagreement payoffs when the other party
is the owner. Halonen-Akatwijuka and Pafilis (2014) have added location choice.
Schmitz (2015) and Müller and Schmitz (2017) have studied optimal ownership of
public goods when there are bargaining frictions in negotiations that take place
under symmetric information. Building on Halonen’s (2002) important reputa-
tion model that was developed in a private-good setting, Halonen-Akatwijuka and
Pafilis (2020) have recently studied ownership of public goods in a repeated game.
Finally, the role of asymmetric information has also been studied in the context
of public-private partnerships by Hoppe and Schmitz (2013) and Buso (2019). Yet,
following Hart (2003) these papers do not explore optimal ownership structures;
instead, they are focused on the question whether or not different tasks should be
bundled in a partnership.7
Organization of the paper. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.
In Section 2, we introduce the basic model and discuss the first-best benchmark
solution. In Section 3, we study the case of symmetric information and show that
our simple model replicates the main insight of Besley and Ghatak (2001), accord-
ing to which the investment technology does not matter in a public-good context.
In Section 4, we introduce asymmetric information and point out that now the
7Hart (2003, p. C71) points out that he ignores ownership issues and that he takes bundling
to be the key property of a public-private partnership. With regard to the contract-theoretic
literature on public-private partnerships, cf. also the recent work by Iossa and Martimort (2015a),
Martimort and Straub (2016), Buso et al. (2017), and Henckel and McKibbin (2017). See also
Li et al. (2015), who study the bundling of tasks in procurement auctions where the firms
have private information about their costs. Schmitz (2012) explores investment incentives in a
public-good setting with private information, though without studying ownership issues.
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investment technology matters, vindicating the original insights of Grossman and
Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990) also in a public-good setting. Concluding
remarks follow in Section 5.
2 The Model
2.1 The basic setting
Consider two risk-neutral parties, A and B, who can undertake human-capital in-
vestments in order to provide a public good.8 At some initial date 0, an ownership
structure o ∈ {A,B} is chosen. At date 1, party A invests a ≥ 0 and party B
invests b ≥ 0. The investments are observable but non-contractible. Let party A’s
investment costs be given by 1
2
cAa




2, where cA > 0 and cB > 0.
At date 2, after the investments are sunk, the parties’ valuations of the public
good are realized and provision of the public good becomes contractible. Specifi-
cally, partyA learns the realization of the random variableΘA ∈ {0, 1}, which indi-
cates whether or not party A values the public good highly. Let θA = Pr{ΘA = 1}.
Similarly, party B learns the realization of the independently distributed random
variable ΘB ∈ {0, 1}, where θB = Pr{ΘB = 1}. Note that we can interpret θA
and θB as the expected valuations of party A and party B, respectively. The
parties can now negotiate about the provision of the public good. Specifically, we
suppose that with probability 1/2, party A can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to
party B, and otherwise party B can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to party A.9
8In Besley and Ghatak’s (2001) lead example, party A is the government and party B is
an NGO (so A-ownership is public and B-ownership is private). However, party A and party
B could also be two different government agencies (e.g., at the local and at the federal level).
See also Section IV.2 of Besley and Ghatak (2001) for discussions of several other potential
applications, e.g. regarding family economics or scientific collaborations.
9This simple bargaining game has often been used in the related literature, see e.g. Hart and
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If the negotiations are successful and the parties agree to collaborate, the
quantity of the public good that they can provide given the investment levels
is a + b. If the parties do not reach an agreement at date 2, the quantity of
the public good depends on who owns the physical assets that are necessary to
provide the public good. If party A is the owner, the default quantity is only a,
because without party B’s collaboration party A cannot make use of party B’s
human capital.10 Similarly, the default quantity is only b if party B is the owner.
The parties’ date-2 payoffs in case of agreement and in case of disagreement are
summarized in Table 1. Note that when the parties collaborate, they can agree
on a (positive or negative) transfer payment t.
Payoff of party A Payoff of party B
Collaboration (a+ b)ΘA + t (a+ b)ΘB − t
Default, o = A aΘA aΘB
Default, o = B bΘA bΘB
Table 1. The parties’ date-2 payoffs.
In order to keep the paper short, we focus on the most interesting case by
making the following assumption.
Assumption 1. Suppose that θA ∈ (
1
2




Hence, in what follows we consider the case in which the probability that both
parties value the public good highly is sufficiently large.
Note that the outcome of the negotiations at date 2 will depend on the owner-
ship structure. At date 1, each party chooses the investment level that maximizes
Moore (1999, p. 135), Bajari and Tadelis (2001), and Schmitz (2006). Observe that if the parties
are symmetrically informed, this game leads to the same expected payoffs as the regular Nash
bargaining solution (cf. Muthoo, 1999).
10Note that the investments can be interpreted as acquisition of knowledge and project-specific
skills that are not transferable to others in the absence of the investor.
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the party’s expected payoff, anticipating the outcome of the date-2 negotiations.
At date 0, the parties jointly agree on the ownership structure that maximizes the
expected total surplus.11
2.2 The first-best benchmark
Before starting the analysis, we briefly describe the first-best benchmark solution
that would be chosen by an omniscient and benevolent dictator. At date 2, the two
parties’ total surplus is maximized when the parties collaborate, so the quantity
of the public good is a+ b. At date 1, the parties’ expected total surplus is given
by



















Suppose for a moment that at date 2 both parties learn the realizations of the
valuations ΘA and ΘB. Under symmetric information, an agreement will always
be achieved. Consider A-ownership (o = A). If party A can make a take-it-or-
leave-it offer to party B, then it offers to collaborate when party B pays bΘB.
Party B accepts, since by doing so it just gets its default payoff aΘB.
12 If party B
11Note that at date 0 the parties are still symmetrically informed and there are no wealth
constraints, so in line with the Coase Theorem the parties will always agree on the optimal
ownership structure. The parties can divide the expected total surplus using suitable lump-sum
payments.
12We make throughout the standard assumption that when a party is indifferent between
accepting and rejecting an offer, it accepts the offer.
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can make the offer, then party B asks party A to make the payment bΘA. Party













































































Observe that aA ≥ aB as well as bA ≥ bB hold if and only if θA ≥ θB. Hence,
both parties invest more when the party with the larger expected valuation is the
owner. Since the investments are always smaller than the first-best benchmarks,
concavity of the total surplus S(a, b) implies that ownership by the party with the
larger expected valuation must be optimal.
Proposition 1 Suppose that there is symmetric information.
(i) If θA > θB, then a
B < aA < aFB and bB < bA < bFB. Hence, S(aA, bA) >
S(aB, bB), so A-ownership is optimal.
(ii) If θB > θA, then a
A < aB < aFB and bA < bB < bFB. Hence, S(aB, bB) >
S(aA, bA), so B-ownership is optimal.
13Throughout, the superscripts A and B refer to the ownership structure o ∈ {A,B}.
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Note that the optimal ownership structure does not depend on the investment
technology; i.e., it does not matter whether cA is smaller or larger than cB. Propo-
sition 1 thus replicates the main conclusions of Besley and Ghatak (2001) in our
setup.14
4 Asymmetric information
Now suppose that at date 2 only party A learns the realization of ΘA, and only
party B learns the realization of ΘB, so the negotiations take place under asym-
metric information.
Consider A-ownership (o = A). Suppose first party A can make the take-
it-or-leave-it offer. If ΘA = 1, party A will ask party B to pay b, which party
B will accept whenever ΘB = 1, so party A’s expected date-2 payoff is θB(a +
b + b) + (1 − θB)a = a + 2bθB. Note that party A could alternatively offer to
collaborate without getting a payment from party B. Yet, party A’s expected
payoff at date 2 would then be a + b only, which is smaller than a + 2bθB since
θB > 1/2. Moreover, if ΘA = 0, party A will also ask party B to pay b, so party
A’s expected date-2 payoff is bθB. Note that regardless of the realization of ΘA,
party B’s date-2 payoff is aΘB when party A can make the offer.
Next, suppose that party B can make the offer. By analogy, party B asks
party A to pay b, which party A will accept whenever ΘA = 1, so party B’s
14The central conclusion of Besley and Ghatak (2001) is that the optimal ownership structure
is independent of the investment technology. In contrast, the conclusion that the party with the
larger expected valuation should be owner is just due to Besley and Ghatak’s (2001) assumption
that both parties have the same bargaining power (cf. Schmitz, 2013). To see this here, suppose
that party A can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer with probability π ∈ [0, 1], while party B can
make the offer otherwise. It is straightforward to verify that both parties invest more under
A-ownership (and thus party A should be owner) if and only if (1−π)θA > πθB . The important
insight is that this condition does not depend on cA and cB . For simplicity, following Besley and
Ghatak (2001) and many other contributions to the property rights literature (cf. Hart, 1995),
we focus on the case of symmetric bargaining powers (π = 1/2).
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expected date-2 payoff is θA(a+ b+ b) + (1− θA)a = a+ 2bθA if ΘB = 1 and bθA
if ΘB = 0. Party A’s date-2 payoff is thus aΘA when party B can make the offer.



























Observe that the expected total surplus now is


















Notice that S(a, b) − S̃A(a, b) = 1
2
(1 − θB)θAb +
1
2
(1 − θA)θBb > 0. If party A
can make the offer, there is an ex post inefficiency when party B rejects party A’s
demand to pay b (which happens when ΘB = 0) and party A is of type ΘA = 1.
In this case, the surplus is only a instead of a + b. Similarly, when party B can
make the offer, there is an ex post inefficiency when ΘA = 0 and ΘB = 1.











Now consider B-ownership (o = B). By analogy, the parties’ expected payoffs



























The expected total surplus now reads






























Recall that under symmetric information both parties invest more under A-
ownership than under B-ownership whenever party A has a larger expected val-
uation than party B. This result no longer holds when date-2 bargaining takes
place under asymmetric information. It is still true that both parties invest more
(less) under A-ownership than under B-ownership when θA is sufficiently large
(small) compared to θB. Yet, there are now situations in which party A invests
more under A-ownership even though θA < θB, and there are situation in which
party B invests more under B-ownership even though θB < θA. Intuitively, while
the owner’s investment will always be used, the non-owner’s investment will be
used only if the parties agree to collaborate. Since an agreement is not always
reached under asymmetric information, this means that the non-owner’s invest-
ment incentives are now smaller than in the case of symmetric information.
Proposition 2 Suppose that there is asymmetric information at date 2.








Note that A-ownership is better than B-ownership whenever
∆(θA, θB, cA, cB) := S̃
A(ãA, b̃A)− S̃B(ãB, b̃B)
is positive.
First, suppose that both parties have the same investment technology, cA =
cB =: c. It is straightforward to show that ∆(θA, θB, c, c) > 0 whenever θA > θB
holds.15 Hence, when no party has a technological advantage over the other party,
then it is still true that the party with the larger expected valuation should be
the owner.
Next, suppose that both parties have the same expected valuation, θA = θB =:
θ. It turns out that ∆(θ, θ, cA, cB) > 0 whenever cA < cB holds.
16 Hence, in this
15To see this, note that ∆(θA, θB , c, c) can be written as
1
8c
(5θA + 5θB + 2θAθB)(θA − θB).











case the party with the lower investment costs should be the owner. Intuitively,
the investment technology matters for the optimal ownership structure, because it
depends on the ownership structure which investment will not be fully used due to
ex post inefficiencies when bargaining takes place under asymmetric information.
The owner’s investment will always be used, so ceteris paribus the party with the
smaller investment costs should be owner.
In general, the optimal ownership structure depends on the expected valuations
as well as on the investment technologies.
Proposition 3 Suppose that there is asymmetric information at date 2.
(i) If both parties have the same investment costs, the party with the larger
expected valuation should be owner.
(ii) If both parties have the same expected valuations, the party with the smaller
investment costs should be owner.
(iii) If party A has a better investment technology than party B, then A-
ownership can be optimal even when party A has a smaller expected valuation
than party B, and vice versa.
Our main result is illustrated in Figure 1. In the figure, θA = 3/4 and cA = 1.
Recall that under symmetric information, A-ownership is optimal whenever θB <
θA and B-ownership is optimal whenever θB > θA, regardless of cB. In contrast,
under asymmetric information, technology matters. If cB = cA, it is still the case
that the party with the larger expected valuation should be the owner. Yet, if
cB < cA, then B-ownership can be optimal even when θB < θA. Similarly, if
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Figure 1. The optimal ownership structures. The solid curve in the case of
asymmetric information depicts ∆(θA, θB , cA, cB) = 0.
5 Conclusion
When parties can make non-contractible investments in the provision of a public
good, Besley and Ghatak (2001) have argued that the party that values the public
good most should have the relevant control rights, regardless of the investment
technologies. Yet, we have shown that under the plausible assumption that parties
may privately learn their valuations, the investment technologies matter. It may
well be optimal to give ownership to the party with the smallest investment costs,
even when another party has a larger expected valuation of the public good.
Hence, the fundamental insights of the property rights approach that Grossman
and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990) have derived in private-good contexts
also hold in realistic settings with pure public goods.
It should be noted that in this short paper we have assumed that the infor-
mation structure is exogenously given. In future research, it might be worthwhile
to endogenize the information structure by allowing the parties to gather private
information.17 Moreover, following most contributions to the contract-theoretic
17Starting with Crémer and Khalil (1992), several authors have studied information gathering
14
literature on asymmetric information, we have assumed that the parties’ infor-
mation is “soft”; i.e., the parties are unable to provide any evidence (cf. Laffont
and Martimort, 2002). It might be an interesting avenue for future research to
explore the optimal ownership structure in public good problems when parties
may have “hard” information that can be authenticated.18 Finally, while we have
considered sole ownership in the context of pure public goods, it might also be
worthwhile to study the implications of asymmetric information in settings with
impure public goods and various forms of joint ownership.19
in complete contracting models; see e.g. Lewis and Sappington (1997), Crémer et al. (1998),
and the more recent work by Iossa and Martimort (2015b), Su (2017b), and Ye and Li (2018).
Schmitz (2006) has studied the endogenous acquisition of private information in an incomplete
contracting model, albeit in a private-good context.
18For contract-theoretic studies in which parties may have “hard“ (i.e., certifiable) informa-
tion, see e.g. Tirole (1986), Laffont and Martimort (1999), and Schmitz (2021).
19On impure public goods in the case of symmetric information, see Francesconi and Muthoo
(2011). Rosenkranz and Schmitz (1999, 2003) have introduced different forms of joint ownership
into the property rights approach under symmetric information when the owner’s nonhuman
assets may be excludable public goods. On joint ownership, cf. also Gattai and Natale (2017)
for a recent literature survey.
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